

The Army Expeditionary Force A Model for the Next Century of Warfare

**A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

THE ARMY EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: A MODEL FOR THE NEXT CENTURY OF WARFARE, 57 pages.

This study examines the potential for changing the force-structure of the U.S. Army from a forward-deployed model with units permanently stationed overseas to an expeditionary model. The expeditionary model would station all units within the United States and deploy formations overseas on a rotational basis or crisis situation as the national leadership requires. First, the study analyzes the contemporary strategic environment, composed primarily of the global threats to national interest and the national political guidance to the military. Second, the study uses a business model for organizational effectiveness to compare the forward-deployed model of the U.S. Army to the expeditionary model of the U.S. Marine Corps. This business model provides a framework to examine and determine if there is a potential difference in the two models with respect to organizational, or unit, effectiveness. In the course of the analysis, the study determines that the expeditionary model has the potential to produce consistently more effective units in an evolving strategic situation. Therefore, it concludes that the U.S. Army should adopt an expeditionary force structure to function more effectively in the future operational environment.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

It is still possible that one or both segments of mankind will embark upon what will be the last crusade. It is much more likely that they will collide again on lesser scale, as they have before. But even on a lesser scale the game can be lost, or won. We can lose the game not only because of the nature of our enemies, but because of our own.¹

T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*

The United States Army faces a challenge today that can only increase as time goes on. The end of the Cold War appeared to signal a change in the global balance of power and the conduct of warfare. No longer does the United States face a monolithic enemy with massed armored formations poised to storm across Central Europe, or an ideology manifesting itself in insurgencies across Asia. Instead, the United States faces new threats, which take the shape of many forms across the globe and have demonstrated a willingness and capability to strike the American people on their homeland.² This new threat requires a military response that challenges the current, "forward-deployed" force structure of the U.S. Army. It is the aim of this monograph to analyze the current force structure of the Army and determine if it is better than a proposed "expeditionary" structure in supporting the national defense. In the course of the analysis the following conclusion will be drawn: the Army should adopt an expeditionary model for force projection instead of the current forward-deployed structure, thereby making its units more effective and better able to meet the needs of the nation.

In 1999, the U.S. Army responded to the changing operational environment with a new vision for transformation. That vision depicts a force with capabilities designed to meet the threats of today and tomorrow. A White Paper, published by the Army, outlines how this force will be designed for future requirements. "Objective Force units will be substantially different in

¹T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1963), 659.

²U.S. Army, *FM 3-0, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), 1-8 - 1-9. FM 3-0 describes this new threat, additional authors have added to the depiction, which will be studied later in this paper.

structure and content than their predecessors.³ The vision was developed using the current forward-deployed force structure requiring continuous individual replacement to ensure proper and sustained troop strengths.⁴ A possible alternative to the forward-deployed force structure is the adoption of an expeditionary model. This model would require and maintain units in the United States prepared to deploy to a contingency or rotate to a forward area in fulfillment of national security needs. The same Army White Paper advocates change in adapting to the future strategic environment.

While the nature of war remains constant, the conduct of war is continually undergoing change in response to new concepts, technologies, and capabilities. How armed forces adapt to such changes determines their readiness to confront future operational challenge and threats.⁵

This statement in the White Paper illustrates the changing nature of an organization as it attempts to deal with the evolving natural and physical environment. This paper focuses on the prospects of changing the strategic force-structure of the U.S. Army.

The analysis is divided into three areas. First, the current and future operational environment will be analyzed to determine the strategic context that an Army must function and succeed. That environment is made up of the global strategic balance of power, the threats to the nation's interests and the guidance given by national policy.⁶ Second, using a business model for organizational effectiveness, both force structures will be analyzed and compared as they relate to unit effectiveness to determine which model better functions in that future operational environment. Third, a proposed force-structure model, based on the above analysis, will be proposed as a potential solution.

³U.S. Army, *White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force* (Washington, D.C., 2001) [database on-line]; available from Army Knowledge Online, <http://www.objectiveforce.army.mil/>, 4, 20.

⁴Ibid., 1, 9. The White Paper describes a future force that will possess the following characteristics: responsive, deployable, agile, lethal, survivable and sustainable with no comment on changing the actual force structure. The Army replacement system will be addressed in Chapter 3.

⁵Ibid., 8.

⁶U.S. Army, *FM 3-0, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), 1-8.

Operational Environment

The operational environment, as defined in Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, is divided into six dimensions.⁷ For the purposes of this paper, the analysis will focus on the first two dimensions: threat and political. These dimensions of the environment offer a framework from which to look at force structure and determine the feasibility of each. The threat dimension of the environment has changed considerably since the end of the Cold War. The relatively stable balance of a bipolar world has given way to a world challenged with numerous threats of all sizes and capabilities.

The new threat dimension evolves with a number of factors. The strength of regional powers, uncertainty in regional conflict, the rising strength of transnational groups and the increasing power and reach of terrorist organizations all contribute to a volatile and ever-changing global strategic situation.⁸ Three scholars, Samuel Huntington, Robert Kaplan and Thomas Friedman, recently examined the evolving threat dimension of the environment. Samuel Huntington wrote an article in the mid-1990s analyzing this environment on a global scale. His main thesis is that global conflict will exist due to cultural rather than political reasons.⁹ Another distinguished author, Robert Kaplan, argued that conflict in the future will focus on dwindling natural resources and the disintegration of effective nation states. "It is time to understand 'the environment' for what it is: the national security issue of the early twenty-first century."¹⁰ Finally, Thomas Friedman, the foreign affairs columnist for the *New York Times* views current and future conflict with a slightly different lens. In his book, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, he

⁷U.S. Army, *FM 3-0, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), 1-8. The six dimensions of the operational environment are threat, political, unified action, land combat operations, information and technology.

⁸Ibid., 1-8.

⁹Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1996), 20.

¹⁰Robert Kaplan, *A Coming Anarchy* (New York: Random House, Inc, 2000), 19.

states that the globalization of the world's economy will be the genesis of much of the future conflict.¹¹ The combination of these three points of view provides a foundation or environment by which to view a future force-structure.

The second dimension of the operational environment to be considered is the political dimension. Army Field Manual 3-0 defines it broadly as the guidance issued by the President and the Secretary of Defense. "The national military strategy, derived from the national security policy, forms the basis for all operations in war and military operations other than war."¹² This guidance provides political direction and translates ultimately to operational aims and objectives.¹³

Two primary documents outline the missions and roles of the United States Army as they operate within the nation's larger military. The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) provide guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense respectively, focused at the national instruments of power.¹⁴ These two directives serve to set the context by which the U.S. Army will operate in future conflict. Field Manual 1-0, *The Army*, further defines the broad missions that the Army must perform to fulfill these national objectives. These include shaping the security environment, responding promptly to crisis, mobilizing the army, conducting forcible entry operations, sustained land dominance and support to civil authorities.¹⁵ This document, the Army's capstone manual, describes how the Army fits in the national military establishment and how it will achieve the objectives set out by the national leadership.

¹¹Thomas L. Friedman *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), 15.

¹²U.S. Army, *FM 3-0, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), 1-9.

¹³Ibid., 2-2.

¹⁴Ibid., 1-9.

¹⁵U.S. Army, *FM 1-0, The Army* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), 3-2.

The Army's Force Structure

The United States Army's force structure has undergone periodic change since the end of World War II. The evolving security environment of the past six decades forced Army planners and congressional committees to build a structure that ranged from a small force attempting to deal with the perceived realities of nuclear war to a huge force assembled to combat the armored columns of the communist empire. The Army of 2003 stations units using the same decision criteria, the security environment and policy. Currently, the Army combines a forward-deployed and strategically responsive force structure to meet its national military requirements. This force-structure positions almost one-fourth of the total active combat force in Europe (primarily Germany and Italy) and Korea and deploys smaller sized units to contingencies as they arise, from the United States.¹⁶ The reasons for the locations of these forward-deployed units are a result of past and current strategic assessments based on the global operational threat.

Another Model

The Marine Corps currently operates using an expeditionary model of force projection. This operating structure has undergone little change since World War II. The Marine Corps forms itself into Marine air-ground task forces consisting of all of the elements of combined-arms warfare (air, ground, and sea). These task forces have no standard structure and are built for specific contingencies as the situation requires.¹⁷ Twenty-four infantry battalions are stationed in the United States. The battalions rotate on six-month deployments overseas in support of operational requirements around the globe. In normal operations this amounts to a minimum of six battalions deploying as part of independent task forces. This structure accomplishes three

¹⁶The current force-structure and positioning of the U.S. Army was acquired by using the Army Homepage (www.army.mil), determining the size and location of each brigade-sized element and cross-checking that information using another internet source, (www.globalsecurity.com). The combination of these two resources depicts the force described above. This force-structure meets the strategic concepts for joint force deployment in both the most recent draft National Military Strategy of 2003 and the last published NMS of 1997.

things. First, it supports regional military requirements as required. Second, it maintains a ready reserve of infantry battalions trained and prepared to deploy in a crisis situation from home station. Third, it stabilizes forces and reduces personnel turbulence within the continental United States.¹⁸

Combining the elements of national policy, the current operational threat and an expeditionary model already in place provides for the analysis of a possible Army expeditionary force structure. The analysis concentrates on the potential increase or decrease in unit effectiveness and cohesion as a result of the adoption of this new force structure.

Criteria and Comparative Analysis

The study of organizational effectiveness in modern day business offers a potential means of comparing the two models under consideration in this paper. In 1968, James L. Price provided one such model for measuring an organization's effectiveness wherein five characteristics served in the evaluation. These characteristics are conformity, morale, adaptiveness, productivity and institutionalization.¹⁹ This set of criteria is utilized in analyzing the current forward-deployed force structure against an expeditionary model. Price claims organizations that maximize the above qualities will maintain a higher level of success and achievement²⁰.

The analysis provides one measure to distinguish between the two force employment strategies. That measure, unit effectiveness, is only one piece of an extremely complex and dynamic system, but it is arguably one of the most important. Whatever force structure or strategy is chosen and employed, the military and political leadership desire to maximize unit

¹⁷U.S. Marine Corps, *MCDP 1, Warfighting* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1997), 55.

¹⁸Edwin H. Simmons. *The United States Marines*. (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1998) 36.

¹⁹James L. Gibson. *Organizations: Structure, Processes Behavior* (Dallas: Business Publications, Inc., 1973) 28.

²⁰Ibid., 28-29.

effectiveness.²¹ If a distinguishable difference in effectiveness exists, then that strategy might also be more effective.

Recommendation

The final portion of the paper is a proposed model, based on the above analysis, for the operating structure of the future Army. This model incorporates the lessons from all of the elements of the monograph: the national directives, current operational environment, current force structure example, and the organizational analysis. The model provides a method of fulfilling national objectives in accordance with transformation goals and real word requirements, while optimizing unit effectiveness.

²¹U.S. Army, *White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force* (Washington, D.C., 2001) [database on-line]; available from Army Knowledge Online, <http://www.objectiveforce.army.mil/>, v. Both the 1997 and the 2003 draft National Military Strategy highlight the fact that units must be prepared to deter aggression and decisively defeat the nation's enemies.

CHAPTER TWO

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT


The security environment that challenges our nation today and into the next century is driven by the revolving nature of new emerging states and alliances. This challenge is fueled by ancient racial and ethnic hatreds, clashing cultures and the dynamics of emerging democracy in action. This evolving new world order frustrates development of fixed, definitive foreign policies and diplomatic actions.²²

USMC Concepts and Issues, 1994

Beginning in October of 1999, the United States Army published a series of briefings, reports and papers describing how it planned to transform for the future. The Army Chief of Staff signed and published a White Paper, entitled "Concepts for the Objective Force" in 2001 that provided an overview of the transformation effort embodied in the Objective Force.

The Objective Force is our future full spectrum force: organized, manned, equipped and trained to be more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable across the entire spectrum of military operations from Major Theater Wars through counter terrorism to Homeland Security.²³

This goal for transformation is an Army with unique capabilities that allows it to move to crisis situations in a timely manner.²⁴ In conjunction with this vision the Army has published a transformation concept that depicts how the Army will attain the goal of transformation over time.



²²U.S. Marine Corps, *Concepts and Issues, 1994: Taking the Corps into the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: USMC, 1994), 3.

²³U.S. Army, *White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force* (Washington, D.C., 2001) [database on-line]; available from Army Knowledge Online, <http://www.objectiveforce.army.mil/>, iv.

²⁴Ibid., iv-v.

Figure 1: Army Transformation Campaign Plan.²⁵

This figure is a visual representation of the Army's concept for change. By continuously using the Legacy Force, testing concepts with the Interim Force, and introducing advances in technology over time, the Army will evolve to a future structure named the Objective Force. Taking this figure and reconfiguring it in relation to the three forces, the change process over time looks something like this:




Figure 2: Army Transformation Timeline

The Objective Force is a concept that is planned to become a reality just over a decade from now, in 2015.²⁶ The focus of this paper will be on the next five to ten years. During this time period, both the Legacy and Interim forces will conduct missions in support of the national defense. Before the national policy can be addressed though, an understanding of the current operational environment is necessary.

The Strategic Environment

In 1989, the Berlin Wall came down and the Cold War symbolically came to an end. The Soviet threat, by which the U.S. military had focused for the previous half century, fell from

²⁵U.S. Army, *Army Transformation Campaign Plan* in Army Vision (Washington, D.C., 2003) [database on-line]; available from Army Knowledge Online, <http://www.army.mil/vision/>.

²⁶U.S. Army, *The Objective Force in 2015* (Washington, D.C., 2002) [database on-line]; available from Army Knowledge Online, <http://www.objectiveforce.army.mil>. This document, written by the Army's Objective Task Force, describes a future force within the present capability of the military establishment to create and highlights how that transformation could occur.

global preeminence and the bipolar world suddenly changed. Over the course of the next decade many political scientists, theorists and futurists attempted to depict a possible new threat to the United States. The overwhelming majority viewed a world made up of transnational organizations and regional powers that would challenge U.S. interests abroad. In an article for the Strategic Studies Institute, the Honorable Leonard Sullivan, Jr, a renowned scholar on strategic issues stated:

Cold war concepts of superpowers, alliance systems, nuclear deterrence and the accompanying military structures have lost their relevance. The problems and challenges of this diverse disordered world might be better addressed by paramilitary or nonmilitary forces than by military institutions and forces structure and accoutered for traditional interstate conflict.²⁷

As the decade transpired, this threat evolved with changing capabilities and aims and ultimately manifested itself with a massive terrorist attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. This operational environment of the twenty-first century is both unique and familiar. It is unique in that the major threats and global balance of power have not existed previously in the same patterns that they do today. But it is also familiar in that many of the patterns of conflict can be viewed as a culmination of the previous century of warfare.

The threat in the operational environment of the twenty-first century is extremely difficult to define or describe. The threats to the nation's vital interests will take many shapes and sizes and have many unique strategic goals. They will have diverse capabilities reinforced by both ideology and the technology that improves and proliferates daily.²⁸ These threats operate in climates and locales that stretch the expanse of the globe to include our own nation. Any force assembled to combat those threats should have the flexibility and ability to do it.²⁹ Three

²⁷Honorable Leonard Sullivan, Jr. "Meeting the Challenges of Regional Security", Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College), 1.

²⁸U.S. Army, *FM 3-0, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), 1-8.

²⁹President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 29. Both the National Security Strategy of 2000 and 2002 stress the significance of being able to meet a changing and dynamic threat.

distinguished authors have contributed timely and detailed analysis on the subject, and their studies will be used to describe the new and future security environment.

Samuel P. Huntington is the Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. He wrote an article in 1993 entitled “Clash of Civilizations.” This work depicted a world environment engaging in conflict due to cultural reasons rather than ideological ones. Decreasingly would nations or groups of people choose military action to further their political interests. Rather the driving force behind armed conflict would be cultural clashes or differences. "Cultural commonalities and differences shape the interests, antagonisms and association of states ... the key issues on the international agenda involve differences among civilizations."³⁰ As examples, Huntington uses conflict in the Balkans, Kashmir, the Middle East and Southeast Asia to demonstrate how the differing cultures and the cultural interests override political considerations and boundaries.

Robert Kaplan takes many of the ideas that Huntington brought forward and expands upon them based off of his own travels and experience. Kaplan has been writing as a foreign correspondent for more than twenty years, first as a freelance writer and most recently as a correspondent for *The Atlantic*. Kaplan also recognized that the global environment dominated by the two super-powers effectively came to a close in the late 1980s. "The end of the cold war merely set the parameters for the next struggle."³¹ Conflict will grow in areas that are experiencing crisis in natural resources, financial poverty and do not have the ability to support or protect themselves as a group of people. "Future wars will be those of communal survival, aggravated or, in many cases, caused by environmental scarcity."³² He states that people will slowly lose faith in the governments that are supposed to protect and provide basic services for

³⁰Samuel Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations*. 29.

³¹Robert Kaplan. *The Coming Anarchy*. 18.

³²Ibid., 49.

the community. When that faith falters and then breaks, conflict will begin and then spread to encompass greater areas and greater numbers of people. As examples, Kaplan uses areas in Africa, the Middle East and Europe to demonstrate the reality of these changing situations.³³

Finally, Thomas Friedman, a distinguished foreign affairs columnist for the *New York Times*, states that a new balance of power made up of three unique conflicts has replaced the ideologically based conflict between democracy and communism. In this new global system, the rise of globalization has been the greatest influence on the evolving strategic environment and the driving force behind conflict in the twenty-first century.

Globalization involves the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before--in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations, and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before, and in a way that is also producing a powerful backlash from those brutalized or left behind by this new system.³⁴

Instead of the balance of the two world superpowers of the twentieth century, the international balance of power has shifted. Now international security is balanced between nation states, super financial markets and corporations, and highly dangerous or “super-empowered” individuals. “You will never understand the globalization system, or the front page of the morning paper, unless you see it as a complex interaction between all three of these actors”³⁵

These three authors view conflict generating from three distinct sources: culture, resources, and economics. It is difficult to take these three sources and attempt to define an enemy force for which the military should be prepared to defend against. That enemy force could take the shape of many groups, organizations or states. Each of these groups could also possess a range of capabilities and goals. The authors do have views on who these potential enemy forces could be and where we might find them.

³³Robert Kaplan. *The Coming Anarchy*. 20.

³⁴Thomas L. Friedman *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), 9.

³⁵Ibid., 14.

Huntington divides the world into seven civilizations based on cultural heritage. These are the West, Islamic, Sinic, Japanese, Orthodox, African, and South American.³⁶ By showing the source of conflict over the past half century as being political stemming primarily from the stand off between democracy and communism, he shows how this has changed in the last decade of the century.³⁷ The Korean War, Vietnam War, and smaller-scale conflicts around the globe all demonstrate the ideological force behind the conflict. Huntington states that this model for global conflict has changed with the fall of the Soviet Union as a superpower. Now conflict occurs and will occur in areas where these different cultures border each other. These border areas, or "cultural fault lines" will reveal our potential adversaries of the future.

Kaplan views our potential adversaries in two groups. The first is where failed states exist. In numerous areas of Africa, Europe and Asia, different nation-states struggle to maintain control over their populations or continue to try and subjugate those populations in poverty and tyranny. These failed states will ultimately be consumed by internal conflict that will spread to border areas and other states. The second potential adversary is those nation-states that resort to conflict with border nations in search of necessary natural resources.³⁸ These two groups provide the possible areas that the United States might be drawn in to conflict in the future. Friedman focuses on the groups in and out of the global system. Those that are out of the system will continue to struggle to maintain power and fight those that are in the system. Rival powers will continue their struggles for dominance and individual, empowered by technology, will continue to shape conflict in the future.³⁹

³⁶Samuel Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations*. 45.

³⁷Ibid., 19-39. Huntington describes a multipolar, multicivilizational world resulting in the post-Cold War world. He continues to describe other paradigms that can be used to model the strategic balance of power but reveals fallacies in their description and falls back to his original world description, multipolar, multicivilizational.

³⁸Robert Kaplan. *The Coming Anarchy*. 20-49.

³⁹Ibid., 125.

In dealing with the threats of the future operational environment, the actions suggested range from those of avoidance or isolation to those of diplomatic and economic nature to those of aggressive military force. In all cases the proposed actions attempt to maintain a United States as a global power and one that has the ability and position in the world community to protect its vital national interests.⁴⁰

Huntington concludes that in this new global environment two approaches must be taken to reinforce stability and defend national interests. First, nations must know when not to intervene in a crisis and allow the regional powers to settle the conflict. This, he calls following the "abstention rule". Second, nations must understand when it is necessary to intervene and jointly cooperate to settle regional or inter-civilizational conflict. This, he calls following the "joint mediation rule".⁴¹ In either situation, whether a nation follows the abstention or joint mediation rule, that nation must have credible and capable military power to bring to bear wherever that crisis erupts. Following Huntington's model, that crisis could erupt just about anywhere.⁴²

Kaplan offers three actions to be taken to prevent the conflict described above, the last one being military force. The first is humanitarian aid, the second is early warning and the final action, if absolutely necessary, is the use of the military.⁴³ That military force again must be credible and responsive. He states that it should be used sparingly and only when the maximum

⁴⁰This statement comes from a number of sources found mainly in the Strategic Studies Institute. Two are noted below. D. Robert Worley. *Waging Ancient War: Limits on Preemptive Force* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), xii and 38. Huba Wass de Czege. Toward a Strategy of Positive Ends (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 22.

⁴¹Samuel Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations*. 316.

⁴²Ibid., 35.

⁴³Robert Kaplan. *The Coming Anarchy*. 122.

benefit can be achieved. Finally, the duration of its use should correspond to some tangible benefit to both the host nation and the sponsor.⁴⁴

Friedman states that America must be capable and willing to intervene in the world through security or humanitarian missions as required and the requirement might be great. "We have the tools to make a difference. We have the responsibility to make a difference."⁴⁵ This responsibility will pull American soldiers to regions all over the globe against an enemy that will take many forms and shapes. The following table depicts current conflict across the globe.




Figure 3: Current Global Armed Conflict⁴⁶

This picture reveals an international strategic environment with numerous conflicts on almost every continent.

The combination of these three theories reveals some interesting conclusions. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the strategic environment obviously changes, but that fall is only one

⁴⁴Robert Kaplan. *The Coming Anarchy*. 123.

⁴⁵Thomas L. Friedman *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, 437.

⁴⁶The global map is from the University of Texas at Austin Web Site, <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world.html>. The data is gathered from the Army Homepage.

aspect of the change. The environment, rising regional powers, and the global economy all affect the strategic balance of power to some degree. The shared qualities of these three models provide a framework for the future operational environment's threat. The enemy forces in the current operational environment possess and use advanced weaponry, have access to weapons of mass effects and have access to advanced technology. The enemy of today and tomorrow is able to field both large and small formations and conduct insurgencies in numerous countries. The enemy enjoys strong support of local populations and can build strong coalitions based off of religion, ideology and base need. In many cases the enemy will operate with a thorough and durable command and control structure. Finally, the enemy has access to and knowledge of U.S. doctrine and techniques. The combination of all of these capabilities presents a major challenge to the U.S. and its allies, and especially to Army planners trying to meet the guidance of the current and future administrations.

The strategic environment and threat described above requires a military that can respond to emergent crisis as it appears across the globe. That force must be agile and flexible enough to react when the national leaders order action.

Policy and Strategy

The military of the United States operates within the guidance of the civilian government.⁴⁷ The National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy both provide written guidance to the services of the Armed Forces detailing the missions they must be prepared to execute in the future.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a document created by the current administration for the purpose of stating how the nation will defend its interests at home and abroad. This strategy includes the military as one element of national power, but not the only one. President Bush's administration released his first NSS on September 1, 2002 almost one year after the

⁴⁷U.S. Army, *FM 1-0, The Army* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), 1-9.

attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. This strategy describes for the first time a new threat to national security. “Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank”.⁴⁸ This new threat, terrorism, is alluded to in one way or another a total of seventeen times in the first eight pages of the strategy.

In response to this new threat and the continuing presence of previous threats, the Bush Administration takes the following approach. “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”⁴⁹ The first comment speaks directly to the military. In the third section of the NSS, the President guides military action. “Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control and communications; material support; and finances.”⁵⁰ These two quotes are representative of the tone of the document. The military must be able to respond as required to a variety of situations, challenges, and locations.

The NSS specifies regions around the globe that must be considered with regards to terrorism and regional conflict. These regions include areas in the Middle East, Africa, the Americas and Central Asia. The document continues by stating that the military must transform in two areas. It must “focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur”.⁵¹ The document continues to address the need for forces overseas, but in and

⁴⁸President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 2.

⁴⁹Ibid., 1.

⁵⁰Ibid., 5.

⁵¹Ibid., 29.

beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia.⁵² These two examples seem to point to a changing focus from specific regions to flexible response on a global scale.

The strongest statement is the administration's adoption of a strategy of preemption. No longer will the United States wait in isolation or engagement until an enemy commits a hostile act of aggression. If the means exist or the will is demonstrated, the United States will act offensively to preempt future attacks and protect American citizens.

In summary, the current NSS differs from previous strategies in a number of ways. It describes a new global and ever-changing threat to national security. It places an increased emphasis on strategic and operational flexibility. Finally, it formally adopts a strategy of preemption.

The National Military Strategy (NMS) takes that broad political guidance from the NSS and refines it to strategic aims and objectives of the armed forces. This document provides the written guidance from which service planners can model and prepare its forces to operate in the future. The current NMS was released in draft form on October 24, 2002. The Chairman, General Richard B. Myers, begins with a foreword that outlines three priorities: "Win the War on Terrorism... enhance joint warfighting capability ... and transform our forces."⁵³

Like the NSS, this strategy focuses on terrorists and state sponsors of terrorism, but also includes regional powers with significant military forces.⁵⁴ The NMS embraces the tasks of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat but goes one step further and defines national military objectives to meet these challenges. The NMS states that the military must "defend the U.S. homeland, promote security and deter aggression, win the Nation's wars and ensure military

⁵²President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 29.

⁵³Office of the Secretary of Defense. *National Military Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 12.

⁵⁴Ibid., ii.

superiority".⁵⁵ These objectives vaguely define how the military will operate within the national security structure, but the NMS continues to describe how it will achieve these objectives.

"Military power will be employed from dispersed locations to overwhelm any adversary and control any situation, while maintaining the flexibility to rapidly conduct and sustain multiple, simultaneous missions in geographically separated and environmentally diverse regions of the world."⁵⁶ Again, the two strategies appear to be focusing at conflicts spanning the globe and the military's ability to respond.

The NMS continues by describing strategic concepts that will focus the military effort in conducting operations.⁵⁷ The concepts broadly outline how the military should train and equip its forces for the conduct of operations in the future. These six concepts are as follows: decisive force, strategic agility, integrated operations, overseas presence, theater security cooperation, and innovation and transformation.⁵⁸ The operational concepts provide a small glimpse at what is to be expected of the military in the conflicts of the future. Any force structure design should ensure that it is fully capable of utilizing these concepts in the attainment of possible objectives.

Taken together the NSS and the NMS reveal some interesting changes from previous versions of the documents.⁵⁹ First and foremost, the current strategies clearly introduce terrorism and state sponsorship as enemy forces that must be dealt with in the future. Acknowledging that there is currently no potential adversary with the military strength of the United States or "peer competitor", both strategies do account for the possibilities of regional conflict with forces of

⁵⁵Office of the Secretary of Defense. *National Military Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), iii.

⁵⁶Ibid., iii.

⁵⁷Ibid., 20.

⁵⁸Ibid., 21-23.

⁵⁹The statement noted above reflects a comparison of the most current National Security Strategy of 2002 and the draft National Military Strategy of 2003 to their predecessors, the NSS of 2000 under the Clinton Administration and the NMS of 1997 signed by Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

credible military power. The strategies demonstrate that the range of military operations contained in these two potential threats is extremely large. The military must be ready to execute operations spanning the globe in scope, duration and location, while maintaining the capability and credibility to conduct large-scale conventional operations.⁶⁰

Second, and based largely on this threat, the military must be able and ready to work under a different set of conditions. Multinational coalitions will continue to be important in any region and at any scale of conflict. The military must be capable of responding to a crisis depending on the urgency of the mission and the strategic consequences of delay. The military must also be able to project power and overwhelm the enemy.⁶¹ These qualities are all interrelated and necessary to successful military operations as depicted by the NSS and the NMS.

The two documents provide fairly detailed and clear instructions to the Armed Forces of the nation and to the Army specifically. The Army must be able to succeed, not solely against the massive communist armies of the past sixty years, but against any enemy, whether it be in the deserts of the Middle East, the mountains of Central Asia or the jungles of Central America. This is not a paradigm shift in and of itself. When combined with the future operational environment, though, the range of military operations will more than likely be in the latter locations than the former. Only with a military capable of multiple contingencies across the globe for uncertain durations of time, will the nation be able to defend, preserve and extend the peace.

⁶⁰Office of the Secretary of Defense. *National Military Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 15-17. The NMS defines four military objectives that encompass the ability to project power across the globe and maintain the ability to "win the nation's wars" whether those are lesser contingencies or major combat operations.

⁶¹Office of the Secretary of Defense. *National Military Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 15-16.

CHAPTER THREE

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FORCE STRUCTURES

Expeditionary operations have been the form of choice for the United States for the better part of the twentieth century. An expedition promises no 'foreign entanglements' because it does not usually entail a commitment beyond its immediate purpose.⁶²

- Dr. Roger J. Spiller

The Army and the Marine Corps represent two models of force structure. The Army operates using a forward-deployed model and the Marine Corps using an expeditionary model. These two models will be analyzed to understand how they function in today's environment. Once they have been defined, a business model of organizational effectiveness will be used to compare the two force structures. First, the Army and Marine Corps' force-structures must be understood.

The Army's Force Structure Since World War II

The U.S. Army's current operating structure has undergone many changes over the course of the Cold War and since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The operating structure ranged from a small force attempting to deal with the perceived realities of nuclear war to a huge force assembled to combat the armored legions of the Soviet empire. The Army experimented with force structures that were designed to fight across the entire spectrum of military operations, from guerrilla operations to nuclear warfare.⁶³ During this entire time though, the Army attempted to

⁶²Roger J. Spiller, *Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century's End*. (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2001), 89.

⁶³Christopher Bellamy, *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 106.

shape its structure and missions on the strategic environment it faced and the needs of its political masters.⁶⁴

In the decades prior to the Vietnam War, the Army struggled to find a role relevant on a nuclear battlefield. Large numbers of forces were stationed overseas in Europe, across some parts of Asia, and the Pacific Rim. The numbers in Korea and Japan increased during and after the Korean War and remained steady until the beginning of the Vietnam War.⁶⁵ In the 1960s, the United States increased ground troop strength in Vietnam, while slowly stripping personnel from units primarily in Europe. The overriding strategic imperative during this period was the containment of communism transposed on the very real possibility of a nuclear battlefield.⁶⁶ The resulting structure was a large forward-deployed body of troops to contain this perceived threat in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia.

The following table depicts Army troop levels in Europe and Korea over time since the beginning of the Vietnam War:

	Army Strength	Europe Bdes	Europe Strength	Korea Bdes	Korea Strength	Other Commitments
1964-65	972,000	18	237,000	6	80,000	
1970-71	1,363,000	15	200,000	6	80,000	Vietnam
1975-76	785,000	15	180,000	2	30,000	
1980-81	774,000	16	196,200	2	30,400	
1990-91	761,000	16	203,100	2	32,000	Kuwait
1995-96	524,900	6	70,500	2	27,500	Bosnia, Turkey
2001-02	477,800	5	42,300	2	27,200	Bosnia, Kosovo

Figure 4: Army Global Disposition, 1964-2002⁶⁷

⁶⁴Frank N. Shubert, *The American Military Tradition and Post Cold War Operations in Transforming Defense* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 37.

⁶⁵*The Military Balance*. International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 1964-2002), 12.

⁶⁶Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 462-475.

⁶⁷*The Military Balance*. International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 1964-2002), 12.

This data shows that the two decades following the Vietnam War saw an increase in troop strength in Europe and a maintaining of troop levels on the Korean Peninsula. The Army slowly removed units from Europe in the 1990s, but maintained its presence in East Asia at the same levels. It is clear that numbers and priorities shifted as conflicts arose or the global balance of power changed, but a few things remained constant over these decades. First, the United States maintained a steady, sizable presence in Germany and Korea. Second, in response to conflicts and requirements across the globe, additional units deployed to other locations on a temporary and sometimes permanent basis (e.g. the Sinai).⁶⁸ This structure provided for unit rotations to crisis situations while individuals replaced the units stationed forward in Europe and Korea.

In the last fifteen years, the number of these crisis deployments has increased and the variety of locales has ranged from the Balkans, to the Kuwaiti Desert, to areas in Africa.⁶⁹ Based on significant events and threats outside of the traditional European and Southeast Asian theaters, the U.S. Army deployed to fulfill mission requirements in many other areas of the globe. The potential for increased missions of this nature grows as the strategic threat changes.

The Army Today

Currently, the Army operates using both a forward-deployed and expeditionary model. The Army's land combat force consists of six divisions and two brigade combat teams. This amounts to thirty-one brigade sized units of infantry and armor. These units are permanently stationed at eleven posts in the U.S. and on posts in Germany, Italy and Korea. The thirty-one brigades are divided further in their capabilities. Sixteen brigades are considered heavy units

⁶⁸*The Military Balance*. International Institute for Strategic Studies. (London: Oxford University Press, 1964-2002), 11-14. In addition to the troop statistics, information was gathered to reference requirements for forces overseas. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 616-636.

⁶⁹*The Military Balance*. International Institute for Strategic Studies. (London: Oxford University Press, 1964-2002), 11-14 and Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 616-636.

comprised of armored and mechanized forces. Thirteen brigades are made up of light infantry units and the final two brigades are considered medium units comprised of the interim vehicle, the Stryker.⁷⁰ Of the thirty-one brigade-sized units, seven of them are permanently stationed overseas. In addition to these permanently forward-deployed units, the Army deploys numerous other battalion and brigade sized elements in support of mission requirements in the Balkans, Sinai, and Afghanistan. This amounts to almost three additional brigades, bringing the total number of brigades overseas to ten, one-third of the total active force. One third of the force is deployed overseas but over two-thirds of that group are permanently forward-deployed in locations carried over from World War II and the Cold War.

The tables below depict the current force structure and stationing as described above.

Unit	Location	Brigades	Unit	Location	Brigades	
1 ID	Ft Riley	1	82 Abn	Ft. Bragg	3	
2 ID	Ft. Lewis	1	101 Abn	Ft. Campbell	3	
3 ID	Ft. Stewart/Benning	3	172 SIB	Alaska	1	
4 ID	Ft. Hood/Carson	3	1 CAV	Ft. Hood	3	
10 ID	Ft. Drum	2	1 AD	Ft. Riley	1	
25 ID	Hawaii/ Lewis	3				Total 24

Figure 5: US Stationed Forces

Unit	Location	Brigades	Unit	Location	Brigades	
1 ID	Germany	2	2 ID	Korea	2	
1 AD	Germany	2	173 SIB	Italy	1	
						Total 7

Figure 6: Forward-Deployed Forces

Unit	Location	Brigades	Unit	Location	Brigades	
Bosnia		0.5	Sinai		0.5	
Kosovo		1	Kuwait		1	
Afghanistan		2				Total 5

Figure 7: Current Overseas Requirements

⁷⁰This information was gathered from a review of the Army Homepage [database on-line]us.army.mil.

The picture described above represents the Army in the months following September 11, 2001. The above information illustrates the numbers of brigade-sized units available for other contingencies or crisis as they occur. In effect, less than two-thirds of the total active force or six divisions are currently not stationed overseas. The other one-third of the force is forward-deployed. When a crisis occurs today or a requirement exists, the Army alerts an uncommitted unit, trains it, and deploys it as necessary.⁷¹ With the operational environment demanding action in dispersed areas around the globe, these uncommitted, prepared units become more valuable.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the Army reconstitutes its forward-deployed units through an individual replacement system. Soldiers and at times, their families, move to their new posts or stations every one to four years.⁷² This creates turbulence within the gaining and losing units that must be considered and overcome in the preparation for and execution of future missions. The following figure depicts the Army's current overseas positioning both by station and crisis.



Figure 8: Current Army Overseas Stationing / Projection⁷³

⁷¹Richard L. Kugler, *Replacing the 2 MTW Standard: Can a Better Approach Be Found in Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 44.

⁷²U.S. Army, AR 600-8-11, *Reassignment* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), pg 3

⁷³The global map is from the University of Texas at Austin Web Site, <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world.html>. The data is gathered from the Army Homepage.

The Army permanently stations units in Korea and Germany and has done so since the close of World War II. It then deploys whole units to contingency situations as they present themselves. These units are requested by a Regional Combatant Commander and provided by the Department of the Army.⁷⁴ The above picture (Figure 8) portrays the current deployment of Army units overseas, both stationed and deployed. The deployed units are in the Balkans, Sinai, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and Kuwait. The difference between these contingency deployments and the forward-deployed units in Korea and Germany is that the contingency deployments operate with a rotation of entire units, normally on a six-month cycle.⁷⁵ Korea and Germany require individual replacements to maintain its personnel strengths over time.

Many experts have argued that the forward-deployed bases in Germany and Korea serve as a platform to project military power throughout the world. In 1997, U.S. Army Europe published a strategy stating clearly that power projection was one of its primary tasks.⁷⁶ The ability of Europe to function as an effective platform for other deployment has been debated as well. A study on humanitarian intervention completed by Alan J. Kuperman in 2001 highlighted some of the difficulties inherent to deploying large forces to a contingency area. Kuperman noted that a number of constraints affect the United States' ability to quickly respond to crisis. Some of these constraints were strategic and intra-theater airlift, airfields, refueling capability, and air

⁷⁴U.S. Army, *FM 3-0, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), 2-13. A discussion of the component commander's responsibility in accomplishing operational-level tasks.

⁷⁵Two separate web sites affirm the six-month rotation policy to locations in Europe and Southwest Asia. The first is from the NATO Handbook [database on-line] <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/htm> and Global Security.org [database on-line] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/intrinsic_action.htm

⁷⁶U.S. Army Europe, *USAREUR Strategy XXI*, [database on-line] available from the USAREUR Homepage at <http://www.hqusareur.army.mil/nurevision%20files/htmllinks/USAREURStrategyXXI.doc>

space restrictions.⁷⁷ The realities of moving forces from locations overseas can many times make these forces less responsive to crisis as required.

The most recent Quadrennial Review also addressed the difficulties of moving forces from locations in Europe to crisis even on the same continent. That study noted during Operation Allied Force a number of conditions that challenged military planners in the projection of vehicles and equipment. The weather, transportation network and primitive landing pads all had a negative effect on the theater force projection plan.⁷⁸ These constraints and the above study illustrate the inherent difficulties of moving units from an immature theater to a crisis situation and demonstrate that force projection is sometime less difficult from locations within the United States. These challenges are lessened when the crisis occurs near a forward-deployed force, but as the analysis of the future operational environment reveals, the chances for a range of crisis in many parts of the world is increasing.

The following table depicts the turbulence over time that occurs within the current force structure of the Army. This table takes the data gathered from Army internet sources to depict as accurately as possible the current positioning of combat maneuver brigades (infantry and armor) throughout the force. Using this information and taking an average length of tour to be three years (from one to four), the resulting turbulence can be assessed. On average, every unit would experience a one-third turnover per year based on an average tour length of three years. Korea is the exception, where the average tour is one year. Therefore, brigades in Korea experience a near complete turnover in personnel throughout the course of the year. The table below captures this turnover using the planning figures described above.

⁷⁷Alan J. Kuperman. *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001) 52-62.

⁷⁸Michele A. Flournoy, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2001* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 2001) 242-243.

Conus - Based Forces

Station	Brigade Equivalent Strength	PCS / per year (in Bde Equiv)
Alaska	1	0.3
Hawaii	2	0.7
Lewis	2	0.7
Carson	1	0.3
Riley	2	0.7
Hood	5	1.6
Campbell	3	1.0
Benning	1	0.3
Bragg	3	1.0
Stewart	2	0.7
Drum	2	0.7
Total	24	8

Overseas - Based Forces

Station	Brigade Equivalent Strength	PCS / per year (in Bde Equiv)
Germany	4	1.3
Korea	2	2.0
Italy	1	0.3
Total	7	3.6
	(23% of entire Active Army)	(31% of entire Active Army)

Figure 9: Army Personnel Turbulence Due to PCS⁷⁹

The table above underestimates the actual turbulence endured by the individual soldiers and the units that they comprise. Based on an annual turnover of every unit in Korea, battalion-sized units numbering about 600 soldiers must process approximately fifty soldiers into and out of their units every month. This is a significant movement of personnel in any organization.

In summary, the Army entering the twenty-first century faces perhaps one of the most complex strategic environments since World War II. The evolving threat of global terrorism,

⁷⁹The current force-structure and positioning of the U.S. Army was acquired by using the Army Homepage (www.army.mil), determining the size and location of each brigade-sized element and cross checking that information using another internet source, (www.globalsecurity.com). The combination of these two resources depicts the force described above.

regional balance of power and numerous conflicts ongoing around the world present a difficult situation in which the Army must be prepared and able to fight for the nation. Currently the Army achieves this through a combination of units stationed overseas and units stationed in the United States able to deploy and respond to varied situations around the globe. This is a combination of forward-deployed and expeditionary force structures. Is a combination needed? Or is one or the other the optimum solution for this day and age? The Marine Corps made that decision after World War II.

Another Model

The Marine Corps uses an expeditionary model for its force-structure. Since World War II, its operating structure has seen little of the kind of turmoil and changes that the Army experienced. It has and still operates using an expeditionary model of force projection.⁸⁰ Marine combat units are stationed at and train in the United States and deploy on semi-annual rotations or as required in support of the nation's security requirements. This mentality and structure provides for "strategic agility, operational reach and tactical flexibility" necessary for operations in unique and varied environments.⁸¹ The Marine Corps states that this expeditionary culture has benefited the national defense as a whole for the past half century. "Cultivated and enriched over the past 70 years with precious human and fiscal investments, this force-in-readiness remains a key element for America's success in an uncertain future".⁸²

⁸⁰Edwin H. Simmons, *The United States Marines* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1998) 195-270.

⁸¹U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Strategy 21* (Washington, D.C., 2000) [database on-line]; available from Marine Expeditionary Units, [http://www.usmc.mil/templateml.nsf/25241abbb036b230852569c4004eff0e/\\$FILE/strategy.pdf](http://www.usmc.mil/templateml.nsf/25241abbb036b230852569c4004eff0e/$FILE/strategy.pdf), 1.

⁸²U.S. Marine Corps, *Concepts and Issues, 1994: Taking the Corps into the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: USMC, 1994), pg 1-3.

Marine Corps doctrine describes a force with almost unlimited capability, prepared for contingencies across the globe or as required by the nation's leadership.⁸³ The expeditionary force provides the structure to fulfill that promise. The Marine Corps currently possesses 24 infantry battalions stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina and Camp Pendleton, California. These battalions rotate through a regular deployment cycle overseas. On deployments, the infantry battalion with its accompanying air and ground support comprise a Marine Expeditionary Unit. "Operating forward-deployed from the sea, the MEU is unconstrained by regional infrastructure requirements or restrictions imposed by other nations."⁸⁴ The standard rotation requires six of the 24 battalions to continually deploy overseas on ships and take positions in the Atlantic/Mediterranean (1 battalion), the Indian Ocean (1 battalion) and on Okinawa/Pacific (4 battalions). Units are not stationed permanently in any one of these locations, thus eliminating the requirement for individual replacements, moves and transition. The battalion, as part of that expeditionary unit, sails to the required areas for six-month deployments in support of those requirements. During those deployments personnel turnover is not allowed with only few exceptions for emergency situations.⁸⁵ The marines are stabilized during their overseas deployments. This stability changes when those units return from their deployment. Upon return individuals are permitted to move on to their next school or duty assignment. This period of time is when the turbulence exists within the marine battalions.⁸⁶

This operating structure enables a force where "marines are prepared to deploy into diverse, austere, and chaotic environments on short notice and accomplish assigned missions ...

⁸³U.S. Marine Corps, *MCDP 1-0, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001) [database on-line]; available from Marine Corps Home Page, <https://wwwdoctrine.usmc.mil>, 1-2 - 1-3.

⁸⁴U.S. Marine Corps, *Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare* (Washington, D.C., 2001) [database on-line]; available from Marine Expeditionary Units, <http://192.156.19.109/emw.pdf>, 9.

⁸⁵Major Matt Travis, USMC, interview by author, 10 February 2003, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth.

⁸⁶Major Matt Travis, USMC, interview by author, 10 February 2003, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth.

operating independently of existing infrastructures.⁸⁷ Battalions in the Marine Corps normally use six months to prepare for a deployment and take six more months at the conclusion of the deployment to refit and reorganize. This six-month cycle provides some continuity and a measure of stability to a marine soldier's life. With one-fourth of the force deployed at any one time, the remaining forces focus on mission recovery and preparation as required.⁸⁸

The tables below depict the current operating structure of the Marine Corps.

Unit	Location	Battalions	Total
1 st Mar Div	California	11	
2d Mar Div	N. Carolina	13	
			24

Figure 10: Marine Forces Stationed in Conus

Unit	Location	Battalions	Total
	Atlantic/Med	1	
	Indian Ocean	1	
	Okinawa/Pacific	4	
			6

Figure 11: Marine Force Current Overseas Requirements

The Marine Corps and the Army share many characteristics. Both have trained and lethal combat battalions prepared to support the national defense. Both position units overseas to react to contingency situations or to establish military presence in unstable international environments. Both have the capability to quickly reinforce these forward-deployed units as the operational situation dictates. The Marine Corps, however, uses this framework of an expeditionary force to cultivate a culture.

For Marines, the term expeditionary connotes more than the mere capability to deploy overseas when needed. Expeditionary is our ethos; a pervasive mindset that influences

⁸⁷U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Strategy 21* (Washington, D.C., 2000) [database on-line]; 2.

⁸⁸U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1, *Warfighting* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997), 54-55. The U.S. Marine capstone doctrinal manual discusses in detail the flexibility inherent in having expeditionary forces positioned overseas, prepared to react to crisis and ready forces in the U.S. ready to respond as required.

all aspects of organizing, training and equipping by acknowledging the necessity to adapt to the conditions mandated by the battlespace.⁸⁹

This expeditionary nature translates into more than just being able to get on a ship and move quickly. It creates a mentality that every marine unit is prepared to participate in any mission as necessary around the world.

There are two key differences though between the two services. First, the Army stations almost one-fourth of the entire active force in two locations, Korea and Germany, that may or may not require their service or even support their presence. Second, the Army replenishes these units using an individual replacement system. The Marine Corps deploys units, not individuals. These two differences stand out as considerations for future analysis. Immediately following World War II, an analyst of Marine performance during the war concluded that “it is imperative that the U.S. have a branch of service which devotes full time to devising ways of projecting land power overseas against targets held by hostile forces.”⁹⁰

Defining the Criteria

Organizational effectiveness models have been used in the twentieth century to assess and improve businesses. This approach will be used to compare the two force-structures and determine if there is any comparable difference. This difference in organizational effectiveness could be viewed to equate to a potential difference in unit effectiveness. Many scholars have attempted to deal with the issues of organizational effectiveness over the past three decades. These individuals took many approaches in attempting to understand how organizations succeed and then further to quantify those qualities that lead to success. They provided theories by which

⁸⁹U.S. Marine Corps, *Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare* (Washington, D.C., 2001) [database on-line]; 7.

⁹⁰Robert J. Moskin, *The U.S. Marine Corps Story* (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co, 1988),425.

many major corporations achieved success in the latter part of the century, apparently achieving organization effectiveness.⁹¹

Organizational effectiveness is a concept used to describe successful groups of people focused at a common goal.⁹² Although the business community quantifies success primarily in monetary gains and the military in mission success, both are focused at a goal. Both are dealing with limited resources, constraints and limitations, guidance and most importantly, people.⁹³ Therefore, the variables used to measure organizational effectiveness in the business community will be used in measuring unit effectiveness in the U.S. Army.

James L. Price conducted an extensive survey of literature dealing with organizational performance in 1968. He surveyed 50 different published studies of organizational behavior to explain the determinants of effective goal achievement. His study included numerous organizations with the goal of defining those variables that could advance some propositions about determinants of organizational effectiveness.⁹⁴ Price concluded that five primary factors indicate organizational effectiveness: conformity, morale, adaptiveness, productivity and institutionalization.⁹⁵ The analysis of this paper will focus on the two force-structures under examination with respect to these variables.

Price's first criteria is conformity. He defines this as "the degree to which members of the organization accept the norms of the organization."⁹⁶ The variable also includes the degree to

⁹¹James L. Gibson. *Organizations: Structure, Processes, Behavior.* (Dallas: Business Publications, Inc., 1973) 21.

⁹²Ibid., 21. Gibson describes organizational effectiveness as to the extent an organization achieves its goals with the constraints of limited resources.

⁹³Ibid., 18-26. The author discusses organizational effectiveness and how that effectiveness translates into measurable output.

⁹⁴Ibid., 27.

⁹⁵Ibid., 29.

⁹⁶Ibid., 28.

which an organization integrates the actions of the members of the organization.⁹⁷ For the purposes of this monograph this definition of conformity will be adapted to the following: the integration and transition of new members into a unit. To measure this criteria, the study will focus on personnel turnover within units. The greater the turnover, the more difficult it will be to achieve a high level of conformity.

As stated earlier, the U.S. Army maintains its personnel readiness in Germany and Korea through an individual replacement system. The U.S. Marine Corps replaces individuals in units across the United States, but deploys entire units to rotations and crisis overseas as the situation requires.⁹⁸ There is a difference between the two systems. One system operates on an individual basis and requires those soldiers and at times, their families, to move overseas and transition into the new country and environment. The other system operates by moving units overseas to fulfill those forward-presence functions. The challenge within the Army is that units must continually deal with the turbulence incurred from transitioning new soldiers. The challenge the Marine Corps faces is how to maintain a high state of readiness within its units when a high turnover takes place in a short duration of time (upon redeployment from a mission overseas).⁹⁹ The Marine model provides a higher level of stability within a unit during the months leading to and including a deployment, but must make up the rotation of soldiers upon redeployment.¹⁰⁰ The two models can be displayed graphically in the following figure.

⁹⁷James L. Gibson. *Organizations: Structure, Processes, Behavior.* (Dallas: Business Publications, Inc., 1973) 28.

⁹⁸Major Matt Travis, USMC, interview by author, 10 February 2003, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth.

⁹⁹Major Matt Travis, USMC, interview by author, 10 February 2003, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth.

¹⁰⁰Major Matt Travis, USMC, interview by author, 10 February 2003, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth.




Figure 12: Concept Model of Personnel Turnover

This model provides a framework to understand the differences between the two services and their replacement systems. This framework will assist in the comparison of the two force-structures.

Price's second criteria is morale. He defines morale as "the extent to which the motives of individual members are satisfied."¹⁰¹ This monograph will adapt the definition to the following for the purpose of analysis: the intangible quality representing an individual and unit's motivation in being part of the unit. The measurement of this criteria will be reenlistment rates, using a forward-deployed and expeditionary force-structure. The structure with the overall higher reenlistment rate will be considered to have higher morale.

In comparing the two force-structures then, a macro view will first be taken over the past six years to determine if there is a measurable or significant difference. These numbers illustrate the respective percentages of soldiers and officers that were reenlisted during that year from the entire population. The table below depicts the statistics for first and mid term soldiers and officers to through the grade of captain:

¹⁰¹James L. Gibson. *Organizations: Structure, Processes, Behavior.* 29.

		95	96	97	98	99	00
First Term Enlisted Rates	Army	40.2	38.7	41.8	39.6	38.2	38.3
	Marine	21.9	21.3	21.5	21.6	21.3	25.2
Second Term Enlisted Rates	Army	54.5	48.7	54.9	52.1	50.9	50.5
	Marine	41.4	46.1	45.3	44.9	42.8	44.4
Officer Continuation (0-5 yrs)	Army	92.5	91.7	91.0	90.9	91.0	90.0
	Marine	91.4	92.0	94.0	94.7	92.8	93.8
Officer Continuation (6-9 yrs)	Army	96.0	91.2	91.8	89.7	89.6	89.0
	Marine	88.2	89.9	91.1	90.4	90.2	90.0

Figure 13: Army/Marine Corps Reenlistment and Continuation Rates¹⁰²

The second portion of data used to compare the two force-structures is a sample of reenlistment accomplishments within the U.S. Army in its units stateside and overseas. This information will illustrate the relative success or failure of those units forward-deployed in comparison to the rest of the force and the U.S. Marine Corps. The following table illustrates those statistics in overall percentage of reenlistment mission accomplishment:

		U.S. Army	8th Army (Korea)	USAREUR (Germany)	FORSCOM (U.S.)
1999	First Term	104	118.9	128.0	101.9
	Mid Term	106	125.8	124.1	100.2
2000	First Term	109	130.3	123.6	103.4
	Mid Term	104	134.2	126.6	99.7
2001	First Term	161	135.5	131.1	104.4
	Mid Term	108	128.0	129.7	103.0
2002	First Term	115	142.4	166.6	124.6
	Mid Term	113	108.1	128.6	106.6

Figure 14: Army Reenlistment (by Army/MACOM)¹⁰³

The third criteria for comparison is entitled adaptiveness. Adaptiveness "is defined as the extent to which the organization can respond to changes." These changes range over three primary activities in Price's study: "satisfying interests, observing codes and acting rationally" but

¹⁰²Beth Asch and James Hosek, *Military Recruiting and Retention After FY 2000 Military Pay Legislation* (Santa Monica: Rand Publications, 2002), 89-91.

¹⁰³Interview with Mr. Doug McCann, Senior Retention Analyst, Retention Management Division, PERSCOM, U.S. Army, 1 April 2003.

this paper will take a more broad approach to the definition.¹⁰⁴ This monograph will take the criteria of adaptiveness and use the following definition: the flexibility of an organization to receive and succeed in new and different missions. The measurement for this criteria will be an analysis of a group of distinguished author's views on combat and unit effectiveness. These views based on thorough research can reveal some lessons on those organizations and units that succeed in combat and overcome adversity.

S.L.A. Marshall wrote one of the most well known works in 1947, entitled *Men Against Fire*. Marshall took his personal observation and study of the First and Second World Wars and wrote an insightful book talking to what makes a soldier fight. His conclusions were that the most important thing in preparing for combat was a strong sense of teamwork and realistic training.¹⁰⁵ He states further:

It is therefore to be noted as a principle that, all other things being equal, the tactical unity of men working together in combat will be in the ratio of their knowledge and sympathetic understanding of each other.¹⁰⁶

Marshall recognized the importance of strong bonds and trust between soldiers and units. These bonds were built over time. Another author, Anthony Kellett, again studying the two world wars and combat prior concluded that a number of factors affected combat motivation: the primary group, unit esprit, manpower, socialization, training, discipline, leadership and ideology.¹⁰⁷ Of these many factors, almost all can trace themselves to continuity within a unit. The more time a group trains and works together, the more cohesive it becomes and the more likely it will succeed in combat.¹⁰⁸ "Most soldiers are unwilling to take extraordinary risks, but their self-esteem and

¹⁰⁴James L. Gibson. *Organizations: Structure, Processes, Behavior*. 29.

¹⁰⁵S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947), 1.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 149.

¹⁰⁷Anthony Kellett, *Combat Motivation* (Boston: Kluwer Incorporated, 1982), 319-329.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 321-322. Kellett recognizes that the primary group and unit esprit are critical to combat motivation and must be continually propagated.

their membership in the group require that their actions will not be judged unworthy by their fellows."¹⁰⁹

Two other authors wrote works on the psychological aspects of killing and combat. Charles W. Sydnor Jr. studied an elite unit within the German Army of World War II, the SS Totenkopfdivision. LTC Dave Grossman studied the individual psychology associated with combat. In his book, *Soldiers of Destruction*, Sydnor examined the creation of an elite and loyal fighting force that distinguished itself time and again over the course of the entire war. He stated that the commander of the unit placed the highest priority on camaraderie and unit esprit.¹¹⁰ This emphasis resulted in that unit performing exceptionally well under the most demanding circumstances. That unit's performance "would not have been possible without a formidable degree of institutional solidity - the presence of shared assumptions and beliefs, commonly accepted norms and unquestioned values."¹¹¹ LTC Grossman saw many of the same lessons in his study, entitled *On Killing*. He wrote that the "bonding is so intense that it is fear of failing these comrades that preoccupies most combatants. The guilt and trauma associated with failing to fully support men who are bonded with friendship and camaraderie on this magnitude is profoundly intense."¹¹²

The above analysis demonstrates that camaraderie and trust are critical to a unit's success in combat. Therefore, unit cohesion and the capability that provides to an organization will be used to describe adaptiveness. If a unit is cohesive, it will be able to adapt and overcome the changing situations in combat and continue to function on the battlefield.

¹⁰⁹Anthony Kellett, *Combat Motivation* (Boston: Kluwer Incorporated, 1982), 320.

¹¹⁰Charles W. Sydnor, Jr. *Soldiers of Destruction* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 28.

¹¹¹Ibid., 346.

¹¹²Dave Grossman, *On Killing* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 90.

Price's fourth criteria is productivity. It "is defined as the ratio of output to input" or efficiency.¹¹³ For the purposes of this analysis, the definition of productivity will be the preparedness and mission execution (output) of a unit. To measure this criteria the two force-structures of the Army and Marine Corps will be compared to determine if there is a measurable difference.

The measurement of this criteria includes an examination of Army doctrine as it relates to the possible missions of a unit. Army Field Manual 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, describes the process by which a unit determines its most important missions as Mission Essential Task List (METL) Development.¹¹⁴ In this process the unit commander takes his war plans and any external directives given to him by a higher commander or other agency and analyzes them to determine his most important missions. Forward-deployed units, such as those in Korea, are given a specific war plan to prepare for in conjunction with the guidance from their higher headquarters. This plan narrows their focus and ultimately determines how a commander plans for and trains his unit.¹¹⁵ This analysis of the Army's methodology for creating training plans builds a picture of how differently forward-deployed units prepare for their wartime mission than those that are of an expeditionary model.

The last criteria, institutionalization, "is the extent to which decisions are accepted in the environment."¹¹⁶ This last variable deals with the extent to which an organization will accept the input of all members in the process of achieving the final output or objective. Acceptance and ownership of every individual's work, recommendations and performance is an important aspect of this last variable. The military definition of this criterion is the confidence a unit's senior

¹¹³James L. Gibson. *Organizations: Structure, Processes, Behavior*. 27.

¹¹⁴U.S. Army. *FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1990), 2-2.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 2-2.to 2-19.

¹¹⁶James L. Gibson. *Organizations: Structure, Processes, Behavior*. 29.

leadership has in the decisions made by its subordinates. Using a number of studies of junior officers, the two force-structures will be compared to determine if one is greater than the other in trusting the decisions and abilities of its subordinate leaders. These authors shed some light on how leaders attain institutionalization within an organization and these conclusions could possibly be used in comparing the two force-structures.

Analyzing the Force Structures

The preceding variables and definitions all possess language and meaning understandable and meaningful to the military. The two approaches to force structure under consideration, a forward-deployed and an expeditionary structure can now be examined using the five variables defined above to determine if a significant difference exists between the two with respect to unit effectiveness.

Conformity.

Units all over the world must receive, integrate and transition individual soldiers. Whether that is in Germany, Korea or North Carolina, this reality exists and produces turbulence within every unit experiencing transition. One subtle difference is that Korea requires a tour of one year instead of the normal three. Consequently, units in Korea experience a near one-hundred percent turnover of personnel during the course of twelve to thirteen months affecting integration and transition (conformity).

The two services deal with turbulence in a slightly different manner. The Army is continually challenged, especially in Korea, and manages that turbulence on a continual basis through individual replacement. The Marine Corps opts primarily to stabilize its units for a period of time in preparation for and execution of a deployment and conducts its individual rotations upon redeployment. This method results in a higher quantity of turbulence over a shorter duration of time and a potentially less ready unit during that period of time.

Based on the definition of the criteria, conformity is affected differently between the two force-structures. The Army faces a lesser degree of turbulence over a longer period of time. The Marine Corps is challenged to a greater degree over a shorter period of time. Further analysis of the larger force-structure of a service would determine if it was of a size large enough to withstand the impact of units at a lower level of readiness for a given period of time. That is outside the scope of this monograph however. In sum, neither service stands out above the other with respect to conformity.

Another piece of this analysis can turn directly to the Army itself. As shown earlier (Figure 9), the turnover in units increases considerably when a requirement exists to fill units overseas by individual replacement. A review of the personnel turnover in the Army looks as follows:

<i>Conus - Based Forces</i>			<i>Overseas - Based Forces</i>		
Station	Brigade Equivalent Strength	PCS / per year (in Bde Equiv)	Station	Brigade Equivalent Strength	PCS / per year (in Bde Equiv)
Total	24	8	Total	7	3.6
				23%	31%
				(of entire Active Army)	

Figure 15: Army Personnel Turbulence Due to PCS (Summary)

By reducing the number of requirements for permanent station change by over thirty percent, the expeditionary model provides for increased stability within units over longer periods of time and has the potential to decrease the number of transitions required (once every four or five years instead of three). This increased stability allows individual soldiers the opportunity to conform for longer times as well. Individuals understand the norms and standards of given units and are provided the opportunity to meet and exceed those over time. The increased time on

station and resulting decreased turbulence favors the expeditionary model much more so than the forward-deployed model with respect to conformity.

Morale.

Both force-structures will have units with high and low morale. The data from the Army and Marine Corps reenlistment and continuation rates (Figure 13) demonstrates a relatively stable level of reenlistment over the past half decade in both services and at all ranks. The data itself does not suggest a dramatic difference to compare between the services. Both services have met their reenlistment goals over the past years. This fact minimizes the quantitative difference in some of the data. In the enlisted soldier in their first term, it appears that the Army is reenlisting twice as many by percent than the Marine Corps. The data shows this, but it does not reflect the Marine Corps' needs or requirements to reenlist. The Marine Corps' goal going into the Fiscal Year 2001 was to reenlist 6,056 of 27,000 soldiers (22.4%).¹¹⁷ Their performance over the previous six years demonstrated that they had little problem in maintaining that level.

The data from the table comparing Army internal reenlistment (Figure 14) shows a very high level of reenlistment on the part of the Army over the past four years. More significantly though, the data reveals that those units overseas, or forward-deployed in Germany and Korea are outperforming like units in the continental United States. The combination of this information and the previous data comparing the two services as a whole will provide a foundation by which to further compare the two force-structures.

The information presented in the tables above on reenlistment clearly demonstrate that both the Army and Marine Corps are accomplishing their respective goals and maintaining that performance over time. Interestingly though, the data from the U.S. Army also clearly shows that forward-deployed units are performing better than those units stationed in the states with respect

¹¹⁷U.S. Marine Corps, *ALMAR 034/00*, found on the Marine Corps Homepage, [database online] <http://www.usmc.mil/>, 1.

to reenlistment. This can be attributed to a number of reasons such as targeted reenlistment bonuses, a captive audience and greater effort on the part of those forward-deployed units.¹¹⁸ It can also be viewed as representative of a larger phenomenon that units that are active and deploying in support of real-world operations experience a higher degree of rewarding activity and a resulting higher degree of reenlistment.

In summary, the reenlistment data does not provide for a clear conclusion. Both the Army and Marine Corps, the forward-deployed and the expeditionary force-structures, appear to be maintaining a steady level of reenlistment. The data does show that those forward-deployed units within the Army are performing exceptionally well.

Historical analysis suggests that units that train and endure hardship together are more likely to have higher morale and perform more effectively in combat.¹¹⁹ This conclusion suggests that the expeditionary model would possess a higher level of morale than the forward-deployed model but based on the reenlistment criteria for measurement of this factor, the two force-structures are equal.

Adaptiveness.

The above analysis in conformity demonstrates that units that achieve a greater degree of stability will most likely achieve greater levels of esprit and trust. Longevity in an organization leads to an individual's confidence in himself and those around him and provides an environment in which the team is more important than the individual.¹²⁰ Based on the analysis of personnel turbulence in the criteria of conformity, it appears that neither the Army or the Marine Corps

¹¹⁸Interview with Mr. Doug McCann, Senior Retention Analyst, Retention Management Division, PERSCOM, U.S. Army, 1 April 2003.

¹¹⁹S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947), 76-131. A combination of Marshall's study and Kellett's study lead to a common theme. That theme is that trust is essential to unit performance in combat, and that trust can only be gained over time and in demanding situations.

¹²⁰S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947), 123-124.

achieve a greater level of stability in comparison to the other. This leads to the conclusion that the two models are equal with respect to this criteria.

However, based on the Army analysis of personnel turbulence (Figure 15), an expeditionary model for the Army could provide greater time due to less demand for changing stations. The Marine Corps today is working at increasing the length of tours for individuals from an average of three to an average of four to five years.¹²¹ This increased time, if even only in units rotating to Korea, could make stronger, more cohesive organizations. These organizations, in turn, will have a better chance at adapting as necessary to the demands of combat.

Productivity.

Both force structures own units prepared for deployment and employment as required by national authorities. Whether based in Germany or Texas, the units stationed at these locations will focus their efforts to ensure their mission readiness. Based on variables such as command presence, operational tempo, quality of equipment and soldiers even units within each force structure will vary in their mission readiness and final execution. Both the Army and Marine Corps state in their doctrinal manuals that their subordinate units are capable and prepared for contingencies ranging from small-scale to high-intensity conflict.¹²² A comparison of individual units across the ten Army divisions or three Marine divisions would prove largely the same. Each unit, based on leadership, operational tempo and preparedness can execute a variety of missions and achieve success.

The analysis of the Army's training doctrine does reveal some points for comparison. Since a commander bases his training off of his wartime mission, and in many cases that wartime

¹²¹U.S. Marine Corps, *ALMAR 075/96*, found on the Marine Corps Homepage, [database online] <http://www.usmc.mil/>, 1.

¹²²FM 3-0 and MCDP 1-0, both operational doctrine for the two services state that their respective branch of the military is ready and capable to fulfill those missions required by the national leadership.

mission is focused at the defense of a specific geographic area (Korea, Germany in the 1970s/1980s), the resultant ability of those units to react to other situations is less. The current operational environment, as depicted in the first chapter, does not allow for rigid adherence to a global strategy focused on fixed locations. The military must be prepared to react as necessary to a growing and dynamic global situation. Forward-deployed units, focused at certain defensive METL tasks, do not offer the nation's strategic leadership the most capable force-structure in a changing environment.

Each force structure has the potential to provide productive units. A forward-deployed force in Germany or Korea is just as likely to succeed as one stationed in the U.S. Further, that same Army unit has just as much potential or likelihood to produce results as a Marine Expeditionary Force at home or abroad. The difference lies in how those units focus and conduct their training. If that focus is at a specific task on a specific piece of ground, then that unit loses its productive capability to an evolving global situation.

Institutionalization.

Very much like morale and conformity, institutionalization relies on personnel stability of a unit over time. The more a unit experiences personnel turbulence, the more difficult it is to trust and rely on the decisions made by subordinates. Units in Korea experience such a rapid transition of personnel that it is difficult to keep track of leaders in that unit, much less trust the decision-making capacity of those very important individuals.

Mr. Leonard Wong, writing for the Strategic Studies Institute at Carlisle, authored an article that considers surveys, literature and other studies in attempting to deal with the problem of retaining junior officers. In his article, Mr. Wong highlights the importance of relationships and mutual trust within organizations.¹²³ He states that although many factors influence an officer's decision to remain in the service, these two are among the most important. In another

¹²³Leonard Wong, *Generations Apart* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 20.

article for the same institute, Mr. Wong argues that officers must be given more freedom to make mistakes and learn. The trust that junior officers want, the institutionalization, is replaced by a "myriad of controls, checks and constraints."¹²⁴ This trust can only be gained with time. Another study completed by Mr. Ronald Fricker, focused on the tempo of operations and officer attrition, and concluded that an officer's willingness to remain in the service actually increases with the number of hostile and non-hostile deployments. "However, the separation rate among those who deploy, regardless of the rate of hostile deployments, is always lower than it is for those who do not deploy."¹²⁵ This argues for mission-focused deployments as a part of an individual's tour of duty.

Lastly, the above officer continuation statistics used to analyze the morale factor suggest that junior officer retention is rising in the Marine Corps and falling in the Army. This is not conclusive information for a comparison by itself, but when combined with the three other studies by Mr. Wong and Mr. Fricker it provides some basis for comparison. The studies demonstrate again that a junior leader stands a greater chance of gaining a degree of institutionalization the longer that leader is in the unit. The expeditionary force-structure again provides the opportunity for that to happen. Reducing the requirement for change of station by over thirty percent, sets the conditions to gain a greater degree of stability within organizations. This stability can translate into institutionalization.

The two key pieces of data that are revealed in the previous analysis of the criteria are an officer's acceptance in that organization and an officer's reaction to increased deployment. First, an officer gains a greater amount of confidence and acceptance in an organization the longer that

¹²⁴Leonard Wong, *Stifled Innovation? Developing Tomorrow's Leaders Today* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 33.

¹²⁵Ronald D. Fricker, *The Effects of Perstempo on Officer Retention in the U.S. Military* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2002), 35.

individual is a part of the unit.¹²⁶ This would argue again for greater stability in units. As discussed before though, neither force-structure demonstrates a continued ability to maintain that stability. Second, increased operational tempo seems to translate into higher job satisfaction and increased acceptance within the organization.¹²⁷ These two pieces of information tend to favor an expeditionary model for force-structure. That model can achieve relatively higher degrees of stability within the U.S. Army and focus units at operational deployments.

This analysis of the five factors of organizational effectiveness provides a concise comparison of unit effectiveness using one business model. Price's model provides a structure for comparison. This comparison reveals some interesting conclusions when taken together as a whole. The following table depicts the results of the analysis using Price's variables of unit effectiveness:

	Conformity	Morale	Adaptiveness	Productivity	Institutionalization	Total
Forward-Deployed	O	+	O	O	O	1
Expeditionary	+	O	+	+	+	4

+ strength (1) o neutral (0) - weakness (-1)

Figure 16: Model Comparison Matrix

Conclusions

The results of this analysis indicate that an expeditionary force structure would provide the basis for a more effective unit. This analysis takes only one aspect of a unit's description,

¹²⁶Leonard Wong, *Stifled Innovation? Developing Tomorrow's Leaders Today* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 33.

¹²⁷Ronald D. Fricker, *The Effects of Perstempo on Officer Retention in the U.S. Military* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2002), 35.

albeit one of its most critical perhaps, and attempts to distinguish between the two approaches to force structure. Without question, a forward-deployed force provides the nation with capabilities and benefits in the global security environment. It positions key elements of the U.S. Army in regions where they might be required very rapidly. It also sends a message of security commitment to the nations in that respective region. These are meaningful examples of how forward-deployment of forces contributes to the nation's interests. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, it fulfills requirements stated in the National Security Strategy or the employment of forces.

An expeditionary model does not replace the forward-presence of units with another approach. Instead it changes the permanent stationing or basing of these units. The units would remain forward-deployed, as the nation requires, except they would permanently base themselves within the United States instead of overseas in another country. This approach, as stated above, has a great many challenges with respect to budgeting, resourcing, training and strategy. The above table (Figure 16) and analysis do demonstrate that it would have an impact on unit effectiveness. In conclusion then, an expeditionary force would provide more effective units to be used in the nation's interest.

CHAPTER FOUR

RECOMMENDED FORCE STRUCTURE

Just three days removed from these events. Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing.

- President George Bush

Transforming the Army into an expeditionary force structure would be a tremendously complex problem. Dealing with international agreements and treaties, reducing infrastructure overseas and increasing infrastructure within the United States are just some of the difficulties that would face this kind of change. The following pages describe one possible framework of an expeditionary model. The first part of this chapter relates contemporary ideas on the future force design of the Army to a proposed expeditionary model. The second part of the chapter provides one recommendation for that model. This recommendation is a framework by which to begin to model the total transformation.

The past decade has witnessed an enormous amount of introspection by the U.S. Army and the entire U.S. Armed Forces. In a paper entitled "Conceptual Foundations of a Transformed U.S. Army", Huba Wass de Czege and Richard Sinnreich, two distinguished retired Army officers, speculated on the direction that the Army transformation should take. Although they did not state that the Army should adopt an expeditionary force structure, they did suggest implications that the current operational environment has on the future of the Army. They claimed that the future Army should possess general-purpose capabilities, be able to conduct operational maneuver from a strategic distance and participate in multidimensional operations.¹²⁸ In their implications for Army force design, they state the following:

¹²⁸Huba Wass de Czege and Richard H. Sinnreich, *Conceptual Foundations of a Transformed Army* (Washington D.C.: AUSA, Institute of Land Warfare, 2002), 6-7.

Because the nature, scale and ultimate duration of ground force commitments cannot be prejudged, Army formations must be adaptable to a broad range of operational tasks without major reconfiguration, but also without forfeiting the cohesion essential to effective combat performance.¹²⁹

This describes the expeditionary force; a force that is adaptable, flexible and maintains the cohesion for effective unit, or combat, performance.

In another author's analysis, the force projection structure of the past half-century might possibly be losing relevance in the new operational environment. James Shufelt, writing for the Strategic Studies Institute wrote this about the future of U.S. forward military presence.

A complex, but still-dangerous international system is evolving. Some years from now, U.S. forces likely will be operating outside their current security perimeter: in new geographic locations in all three regions of Europe, Asia and the Persian Gulf. In all locations, they must remain capable of defending against lingering or new threats, and of responding to crises and other contingencies.¹³⁰

There also exists a great deal of analysis and discussion on where and how great American military power should be positioned to pursue national interests. This discussion ranges from isolationist views of focusing only on homeland defense to imperialistic views on building the American empire abroad. A Rand Study concentrating on the future of military presence overseas concluded the following based on the military's current forward-deployed posture:

The current posture deploys the largest forces in the least threatened theater, Europe, which is no longer regarded as menaced by the threat of major war. It deploys the smallest forces in the most vulnerable theater: the Persian Gulf, which is threatened by war and potential surprise attack and has weak allies. As for Asia, ... it is not truly an Asia-wide posture.¹³¹

Alan Kuperman's analysis again becomes extremely important to the issue of using forces from overseas locations. In his study he described the complexity of deploying both forces from

¹²⁹Huba Wass de Czege and Richard H. Sinnreich, *Conceptual Foundations of a Transformed Army*, 20.

¹³⁰James W. Shufelt, *Improving the Strategic Responsiveness of the Transforming Force* (Washington D.C.: SSI, in *Army Transformation: A View from the U.S. Army War College*, 2001), 171.

¹³¹Richard L. Kugler, *Changes Ahead: Future Directions for the U.S. Overseas Military Presence* (Santa Monica: Rand Publication, 1998) 16.

home station and those that are forward-deployed. Many times some of the restrictions are greater moving forces out of Europe, contending with airfield size and number, quantity of airlift, and dealing with overflight restrictions. One of his many conclusions is that the United States should consider a more flexible forward-deployed posture than the current Europe, Korea and Southwest Asia.¹³²

These views add to a large body of professional thought on the size, composition and disposition of military forces overseas. If two themes holds true throughout, it is that American military presence is necessary abroad, and the locations requiring that presence will evolve over time as the strategic environment evolves.

The expeditionary model can succeed in the operational environment described earlier. It fields a force capable of dealing with any threat, at any location and in any manner that the President deems necessary. The model succeeds in the operational environment of the future and meets the requirements set out by national policy. That environment has enemy organizations and forces with the ability to conduct the entire range of military operations. These enemy forces have access to weapons of mass destruction, advanced technology and command and control systems, and enjoy the strong support of local populations. Most importantly, they will manifest themselves in conflict on every continent.

The Army Expeditionary Force possesses within its force structure brigade-sized elements prepared to react or deploy with short notice anywhere in the world. Rotational units deploying overseas could maintain a forward-presence and the ability to react to situations as necessary. Forces stationed in the United States could maintain a level of readiness necessary to deploy and fall in on pre-positioned equipment or on their own to supplement or act independently of those forces already overseas. The Army Expeditionary Force could have the capability to succeed in the continually changing operational environment.

¹³²Alan J. Kuperman. *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001) 114.

The Army Expeditionary Force maintains a force structure and a culture that sets the conditions for success on any battlefield, on any scale, and with any means necessary. The expeditionary nature of the Army will allow it the flexibility to change and evolve as administrations and national security strategies evolve as well. Most importantly though, the expeditionary model provides any future administration with an Army trained, prepared and postured for aggressive intervention overseas or defense of the homeland.

The Army Expeditionary Force – One Way

The Army will continue to operate and deal with all the uncertainty of the future operational environment. The analysis of this paper suggests that an expeditionary model of force structure would provide more effective units. From this analysis and in the strategic context of the future operational environment, a working model of an expeditionary force can be created.

Using the current force structure and composition of the Army, the adoption of an expeditionary model would be achievable with little addition to the installation infrastructure that currently exists.. The simplicity would arise from the fact that the Army would not be required to purchase any additional installations outside what is already owned and available in CONUS. This is not to say that improvements and possible growth would not be necessary on existing installations. On the contrary, every installation affected would need some improvements and at the least adjustments, but the majority of the installations involved have already seen troop levels equivalent to this increase at some point in their history.

The following table depicts a possible repositioning of brigade-sized combat units to provide for an expeditionary force structure.

Current Force Structure			Proposed Force Structure		
Unit	Location	Bdes	Unit	Location	Bdes
I Corps	Ft. Lewis		I Corps	Ft. Lewis	
III Corps	Ft. Hood		2 ID	Ft. Lewis	3
1 Cav	Ft. Hood	3	25 th ID	Hawaii	3
4 ID	Ft. Hood	2	172 SIB	Alaska	1
	Ft. Carson	1			
V Corps	Germany		III Corps	Ft. Hood	
1 ID	Germany	2	1 Cav	Ft. Hood	3
	Ft. Riley	1	4 ID	Ft. Hood	3
1 AD	Germany	2			
	Ft. Riley	1	V Corps	Ft. Riley	
XVIII Corps	Ft. Bragg		1 ID	Ft. Riley	3
3 ID	Ft. Stewart	2	1 AD	Ft. Carson	3
	Ft. Benning	1			
10 ID	Ft. Drum	2	XVIII Corps	Ft. Bragg	
82 Abn	Ft. Bragg	3	3 ID	Ft. Stewart	2
101 Abn	Ft.Campbell	3		Ft. Benning	1
			10 ID	Ft. Drum	3
Other HQ			82 Abn	Ft. Bragg	3
2 ID	Korea	2	101 Abn	Ft.Campbell	3
	Ft. Lewis	1			
25 ID	Hawaii	2			
	Ft. Lewis	1			
172 SIB	Alaska	1			
173 SIB	Italy	1			
			Total	31	
	Total	31			

Figure 17: Current and Proposed Army Force Structure

The table above depicts one option for bringing forces back from overseas stations and placing them at locations across the country. It maintains the current number of maneuver brigades and does not require an addition to the existing number of installations within the United States.

The table also shows 31 brigades. These brigades currently equate to 16 heavy or mechanized brigades, 13 light brigades and 2 medium or interim brigades. The Army proposes to convert four interim brigades over the next six years. These brigades are planned to be located in the following areas: Alaska, Hawaii, Fort Polk and one in the National Guard. Taking these

brigades with the total active force brings the final total to 35 combat brigades. These can be organized as follows using the proposed table above:

Type Unit	Unit Name	Location	Brigades
Heavy	1 Cav	Ft. Hood	3
	1 AD	Ft. Carson	3
	1 ID	Ft. Riley	3
	3 ID	Ft. Stewart	2
	4 ID	Ft. Hood	2
Light	2 ID	Ft. Lewis	2
	10 Mtn	Ft. Drum	3
	25 ID	Hawaii	2
	82 Abn	Ft. Bragg	3
	101 Abn	Ft. Campbell	3
Medium / SBCT		Ft. Lewis	1
		Schofield	1
		Alaska	1
		Ft. Polk	1
		Ft. Hood	1
Total			31

Figure 18: Proposed Force Structure by Type Brigade

This proposed restructuring provides an equal ratio of heavy, medium and light brigades across the entire active force. This proposal also only requires a few changes to the current force structure. The first, as already stated, is the continued introduction of the already planned SBCTs. The second is the addition of brigades in the following installations: Riley, Drum, Hood, Carson, and Lewis. The last is that the 2d Infantry Division would transform from a mixed division of heavy and light forces to a completely light division. These three changes would fulfill the above proposal and provide the administration with a flexible Army prepared for expeditionary operations.

This stationing of headquarters and units sets the basing framework to allow the expeditionary model to function. From this proposed posture, the Army provides over 35

brigade-sized combat units for contingencies as necessary overseas or within the country. The Army can now begin to employ a rotational system that provides another degree of certainty to a unit's future and a degree of functionality from which to base contingency planning off of. James W. Shufelt, writing for the Strategic Studies Institute on strategic responsiveness, stated that a rotational system would benefit the Army in future planning. "An Army-wide rotational unit readiness plan using existing active duty organization could parallel rotational readiness systems currently utilized by every other branch of military service.¹³³

The rotational system could be modeled on many examples. The Marine Corps and the Air Force both have operating rotational systems to support their expeditionary force structures. In the model depicted below, the Army would establish four, six-month cycles. These cycles would adapt to the strategic environment as necessary and maintain a level of flexibility to react on short-notice to a crisis situation. This model would provide the broad guidance to division-sized units for up to twenty-four months and look as follows:



Figure 19: Expeditionary Force Operational Rotation Plan

¹³³James W. Shufelt, *Improving the Strategic Responsiveness of the Transforming Force* (Washington D.C.: SSI, in *Army Transformation: A View from the U.S. Army War College*, 2001).179.

This model provides a mix of Army forces for planned and unplanned contingencies and adds a level of stability for units throughout the force and planners building operational plans to support regional combat commanders.

The forward-deployed cycle would require units to deploy overseas for six-months in support of routine or emergent situations. The example above shows the units in the 4th Infantry Division, 2d Infantry Division and an interim brigade from Fort Lewis providing a total of six brigades to the traditional theaters of Europe, the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. This positioning would adjust to the needs of the nation and the national security strategy. There are possible times in the future where no forces would be required in one of the three locations and there are other times when additional forces would be necessary to support our national interest.

This is where the second cycle, or Ready Cycle, is activated. This grouping of seven additional brigades provides a force, trained, ready and stabilized to react on a moment's notice as a situation develops. These forces could be used to augment the forward-deployed units or react to a different situation in another area of the globe. They would also be the first to respond to disaster or crisis within the United States proper.

The next cycle, Training, is a twelve-month period that over two-fifths of the active force would be operating in. This cycle allows units the opportunity to train as necessary to build cohesion and proficiency on all the tasks from individual to collective level. Once a unit completes this cycle, that unit is deemed prepared for deployment. Once it enters the Ready Cycle, it must be ready, because the call or alert could come at any time.

The last cycle, Recovery, is that period of time when a unit returns from overseas deployment in support of the Mission Cycle. This period of time allows a unit the time necessary to refit and reorganize with very little required of it short of a full-scale war. If the system operates correctly and no major conflict arises, a unit entering the Recovery Cycle should have eighteen months before it is required to be ready for possible deployment again.

This system can only work if the broad framework is enforced. Units must have a level of stability in their long-range calendar to maintain a high level of readiness and to ensure that its members remain strong over long periods of time. The morale of the unit and the individual cannot be ignored and will be damaged if simultaneous deployments occur because of a lack of planning or organization. If the system functions properly though, units will understand what's required of them, be able to maintain a regular operating tempo, and slowly build the cohesion, comraderie and proficiency necessary to win on the battlefield. In addition, every unit in the Army is contributing to the overall success of the service.

Summary

The Army Expeditionary Force, in concept, will accomplish three very important tasks for the American people. First, it will better support the National Security Strategy and be able to adapt and support the strategies of the future. Second, it will better operate in the changing and challenging operational environment of the future. Finally, it will provide better units and more effective organizations to deploy in pursuit of vital national interests.

The Army Expeditionary Force can take the shape and form of multiple models and ideas. The solution proposed above is just that, a possible model and a way of moving the Army towards an Expeditionary Force. The advantage to this solution is it involves very little of creating units that do not exist or building installations that do not exist. The infrastructure is there and the few units that need to be stood up are in the plans today anyway. It really involves moving units from overseas to permanent stations within the United States. Moving those units and a strong commitment to an expeditionary force will better ensure that the Army is prepared to meet the challenges of the future and support and defend the people of this great nation.

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